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Abstract:  
Uncertainty can hamper the stringency of commitments under cap and trade schemes.  We 
assess how well intensity targets, where countries' permit allocations are indexed to future 
realised GDP, can cope with uncertainties in a post-Kyoto international greenhouse 
emissions trading scheme.  We present some empirical foundations for intensity targets 
and derive a simple rule for the optimal degree of indexation to GDP.  Using an 18-region 
simulation model of a 2020 global cap-and-trade treaty under multiple uncertainties and 
endogenous commitments, we estimate that optimal intensity targets could achieve global 
abatement as much as 20 per cent higher than under absolute targets, and even greater 
increases in welfare measures. The optimal degree of indexation to GDP would vary 
greatly between countries, including super-indexation in some advanced countries, and 
partial indexation for most developing countries.  Standard intensity targets (with one-to-
one indexation) would also improve the overall outcome, but to a lesser degree and not in 
all cases. Although target indexation is no magic wand for a future global climate treaty, 
gains from reduced cost uncertainty might justify increased complexity, framing issues and 
other potential downsides of intensity targets.  
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1. Introduction 
Uncertainty can be a major impediment for cap-and-trade schemes for tradeable 
emission permits, be they greenhouse gases or other pollutants.  Setting fixed emission 
caps or targets can give greater certainty about future emission levels and perhaps 
environmental impacts, but in so doing it creates uncertainties about costs of complying 
with the commitments.  Economic uncertainty is often a rallying point for opposition 
against environmental policy, whether implemented by regulation or market 
mechanisms.  Where compliance costs are uncertain, environmental commitments tend 
to be watered down.  Where those regulated have a strong degree of sovereignty, as in 
international negotiations, uncertainty can even preclude an agreement altogether. 
International climate negotiations are a case in point.  Apart from global equity 
issues and the ‘blame game’ over who should take greenhouse action – with the USA 
demanding participation of major developing countries from the outset, but China, India 
and others insisting that rich countries have an obligation to act first – uncertainty 
continues to be one of the largest stumbling blocks hampering a global climate 
agreement.  After the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, debate raged over how much 
the Kyoto commitments would cost (Toman 2004).  Estimates diverged widely (Weyant 
1999), and the fact that meeting the Protocol’s fixed quantity targets might have led to 
comparatively high costs even under international emissions trading, contributed to the 
United States pulling out of the agreement.  Bringing developing countries on board, 
essential for a meaningful post-Kyoto treaty, brings even greater challenges from 
economic uncertainty.  Poor countries’ decisionmakers can ill afford to sign a treaty that 
risks major cost blow-outs or ‘stifling development’. 
It is well established that on theoretical grounds, price control is preferable to 
quantity control under cost uncertainty and for pollutants with a flat marginal damage 
function, such as greenhouse gases (Weitzman 1974, Pizer 2002).  Nevertheless, cap-
and-trade is fast becoming the dominant instrument for limiting greenhouse gas 
emissions both within countries and internationally.  The European CO2 emissions 
trading scheme is the largest commitment to this instrument so far, and a number of US 
States are considering their own cap-and-trade systems. The Kyoto Protocol is widely 
seen as a useful point of departure for future international climate policy future 
(Böhringer 2003), and institutional restrictions may work against emissions taxes at the 
international level (Endres and Finus 2002). Emissions targets and trading are the likely 
starting point for the next round of global climate negotiations. Looking beyond 
greenhouse gases, permit trading is increasingly used for many other pollutants, from 
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sulphur dioxide to freshwater quality (Stavins 2003), and cost uncertainty is an issue in 
practically all of these schemes. 
Can cap-and-trade schemes be better designed to reduce uncertainty, and so make 
environmental agreements more achievable and pave the way for more stringent 
commitments?  Several design features have been proposed to reduce uncertainty, 
among them making targets more flexible by indexing target allocations to GDP, thus 
making them targets for the emissions/GDP ratio or emissions intensity.  An intensity 
target can also be interpreted as a conventional, absolute target with an ex-post 
adjustment. If GDP turns out higher than expected, more permits are issued; if it is 
lower than anticipated, the permit allocation is reduced; if expectations are met, it is 
equivalent to an absolute target.  Intensity targets (also referred to as 'relative', 'rate-
based', or 'dynamic' targets) are thus designed to compensate for fluctuations in 
emissions that are caused by fluctuations in economic activity. Note that we discuss 
intensity targets as a means of introducing flexibility to a quantitative target at some 
point in time, as distinct from emissions intensity an alternative way of framing long-
term pathways for greenhouse emissions.  
Target indexation has been proposed as a way for making it easier for developing 
countries to commit to greenhouse targets, and featured in Argentina's greenhouse target 
proposed in the aftermath of the Kyoto negotiations.3 The Bush administration, after 
rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, set a target for future carbon intensity of the US economy. 
Even though this target is close to business-as-usual and therefore has little meaning in 
practical terms, it sparked renewed interest concept of intensity targets – and also 
brought a greater political dimension to what is essentially a technical issue of 
mechanism design.4 Variants of intensity targets ('ex-post adjustments') were also 
proposed by several European governments for domestic permit allocation under the EU 
CO2 trading scheme, but were not implemented.  
In the emerging literature on intensity targets, Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003) 
discussed some basic properties, including that intensity targets may perform better if 
they are indexed partially to GDP, rather than one-to-one.  In a yet unpublished paper, 
they spelt out formal conditions under which intensity targets reduce the difference 
between expected and realised abatement burden (Sue Wing et al. 2005). Their analysis 
is for single countries, so transmission of uncertainty through permit trading is not 
considered. From empirical tests of these conditions using historical data, they 
                                                          
3 On proposals for intensity targets as a way to draw developing countries into a climate agreement, see 
Baumert et al. 1999, Frankel 1999, Lutter 2000, Philibert and Pershing 2001; on the Argentine target, see 
Bouille and Girardin 2002, Barros and Conte Grand 2002. 
4 On the Bush 'target', see van Vuuren et al. 2002, Pew Center 2003, Blanchard and Perkaus 2004, Aldy 
2004, and Pizer 2005; and on ex-post adjustments under EU emissions trading, see Schleicher and Betz 
2005. 
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concluded that intensity targets would have outperformed absolute targets in many 
(especially less developed), but not all countries, and that partially indexed intensity 
targets would have been preferred in general.   
Another relevant, as yet unpublished study is that by Quirion (2003) who used an 
analytic single-region model with two uncertainties to compare absolute and intensity 
targets as well as price-based emissions control. He concluded that for many parameter 
constellations, intensity targets would be dominated by either taxes or absolute targets; 
but that for the greenhouse case (where the marginal benefit curve is flat), intensity 
targets could be an interesting second-best option if an international tax is politically 
infeasible. Kolstad (2005) made a theoretical argument that intensity targets could 
reduce cost uncertainty. 
Criticisms of the concept of an intensity target include its greater complexity, that 
GDP may be problematic as an index, and that allowable emissions levels under a treaty 
become uncertain (Müller and Müller-Fürstenberger 2003, Dudek and Golub 2003). A 
different strand of the literature has pointed out that linking permit allocation to output 
removes incentives to cut back output to achieve abatement, and can thus lead to 
inefficiencies (see Fischer 2003, Gielen et al. 2002). We contend that this is an issue for 
firm-level rather than for national targets, as reducing national output would generally 
not be a policy choice for meeting a national greenhouse target. Potential drawbacks of 
intensity targets are discussed in more detail in Section 6 of this paper.  
Here, we construct a general, variable intensity target under multiple uncertainties 
about future emissions, provide some empirical foundations, and derive a simple rule for 
optimal GDP indexation of emissions targets. We then present what we believe is the first 
multi-country empirical modelling analysis of emissions targets and trading under 
uncertainty, with feedback between mechanism design and stringency of environmental 
commitments. We use a stochastic, globally integrated, though mainly partial 
equilibrium, model of emissions trading with flexible targets under uncertainty, named 
MAGES (Mechanisms for Abating Global Emissions under Stochasticity, see Pezzey 
and Jotzo 2005 – henceforth referred to as PJ). Our model includes three types of future 
emissions uncertainties, the benefits and (uncertain) costs of emissions abatement and 
trading, and risk aversion with regard to countries' expected payoff from an 
international treaty. The model allows to compute optimal targets that are endogenous 
to the parameters and policy mechanisms chosen. Here, the model is calibrated as an 18-
region model of a cooperative (non-free-riding) post-Kyoto treaty for all countries and 
most greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 (MAGES-GHG).  
We begin in Section 2 by discussing some findings on the empirical underpinnings 
of intensity targets, namely the linkage between fluctuation in GDP and in emissions, as 
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well as the relative magnitude of uncertainties about emissions, GDP and emissions 
intensity. Section 3 sets out the theory of intensity targets and derives our rule for 
optimal indexation. Section 4 gives a brief description of the principles and calibration 
of the model (with more detail in the Appendix).  Simulation results and sensitivity 
analysis are presented in Section 5, for scenarios with absolute, standard intensity (one-
to-one indexation) and optimal intensity targets.  Section 5 discusses issues of framing, 
potential drawbacks and practical applicability of intensity targets: Section 6 concludes. 
2. Empirical background for intensity targets  
Is there a link between fluctuations in economic activity and fluctuations in emissions? 
What is the relative magnitude of uncertainties about future greenhouse gas emissions, 
GDP and emissions intensity of output? These questions determine whether emissions 
intensity targets, which link emission targets to future economic growth, can help 
reduce uncertainty in permit markets. Here we briefly explore some empirical evidence, 
which is later used to formulate and calibrate our model. 
2.1 The GDP-emissions link 
The concept of intensity targets as a means to reduce uncertainty rests on the 
assumption that GDP and emissions tend to move together. Intensity targets would link 
the permit allocation to realised GDP levels in order to provide a more lenient target if 
GDP grows fast, and a more stringent target if economic growth is slow.  Thus whether 
and to what degree emissions depend on economic activity as measured by GDP 
determines whether intensity targets can perform better than absolute targets, and to 
what degree the target should be indexed to GDP. 
To this end, we are interested in the co-movement of fluctuations in emissions and 
fluctuations in GDP – what happens to emissions when the economy grows at below or 
above average rates.  This question is quite distinct from the long-term structural 
relationship between economic growth and greenhouse emissions that is the subject of 
most of the ample literature on the relationship between GDP and emissions.   
Several unpublished studies have provided empirical evidence on the GDP-
emissions relationship in the context of intensity targets, though mostly for small 
samples. Philibert (2004) constructed a set of 'forecasting errors' for emissions and GDP 
from a one-period linear extrapolation model applied to historical data. A positive 
relationship is evident between forecasting errors in emissions and in GDP; however, in 
that sample only a small share of variability in emissions is explained by variability in 
economic growth. Höhne and Harnisch (2002) looked at fluctuations in GDP and 
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emissions over time, and detected a relationship between energy sector emissions and 
GDP in three out of the four countries considered. Sue Wing et al. (2005) examined 
emissions forecasts and historical data for a number of countries. They found a positive 
correlation between GDP and emissions in most cases, in particular in developing 
countries; while variability was sometimes greater in emissions, sometimes in GDP. 
Considered together with how stringent emissions reductions would be, this leads to 
intensity targets being preferred over absolute targets in most but not all cases, in their 
analysis. In the published literature, Lutter (2000) found support for a statistical model 
where emissions growth depends on lagged GDP growth, using panel data of historical 
CO2 emissions and GDP. Kim and Baumert (2002) identified a close connection 
between CO2 emissions and GDP in Korea, while Bouille and Girardin (2002) 
concluded that greenhouse emissions in Argentina were linked with GDP only in certain 
sectors of the economy. 
Our own empirical work, using historical data for a large sample of countries, 
confirms the finding that fluctuations in GDP tend to be associated with fluctuations in 
emissions from fossil fuel combustion. Tracking both variables over time (1971–2000) 
shows a significant positive correlation between the deviation of GDP from its trend and 
emissions from their trend, for 23 out of the 30 largest emitting countries. The strength 
of the correlation varies, with a mean and median around one. In other words, emissions 
on average tended to move in tandem with GDP, but with large divergences from the 
mean in individual episodes due to changes in emissions intensity.  
Does such a link also hold for emissions other than from fossil fuel combustion? 
Data for non-CO2 emissions is available only for some years, so we assessed this 
question by constructing 'forecasts' using historical data for a large number of countries. 
There is a significant positive correlation between forecast errors for GDP and for 
energy sector CO2 emissions (as found by Philibert), but no correlation is evident for 
emissions of methane, nitrous oxide and CO2 from land-use change.  
2.2 Magnitude of uncertainties 
Intensity targets will only be able to deal with GDP-related uncertainty, not uncertainty 
about future emissions intensity, or uncertainty in parts of the economy where emissions 
are independent of GDP. So to assess the magnitude of potential improvements from 
intensity targets, the relative magnitude of these uncertainties is crucial.5 
                                                          
5 Throughout, we treat ‘uncertainty’ as the same, quantifiable concept as ‘risk’, rather than Knightian 
(unquantifiable) uncertainty. 
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The literature provides no systematic comparison of these uncertainties. We assessed 
them by again constructing 'forecasts' on the basis of historical data, comparing 
forecasts for the year 2000 made on the basis of information available in 1985. Done for 
a large sample of countries, this yields a distribution of forecast errors, the standard 
deviation of which can serve as a proxy for the magnitude of uncertainty. Uncertainty 
was estimated in this way for GDP, energy sector emissions, energy sector emissions 
intensity, and non-energy sector emissions; and separately for OECD and non-OECD 
countries.  
The results indicate that uncertainty about future GDP is sizeable, but significantly 
smaller than uncertainty about emissions and emissions intensity. This is confirmed by 
an analysis of forecast errors by the International Energy Agency and the US Energy 
Information Administration for a number of countries over the period 1995–2000. 
Uncertainty is greater in non-OECD than in OECD countries; and uncertainty about 
non-energy sector emissions is of a similar broad magnitude as that for emissions from 
fuel combustion. Appendix Table A1 gives the estimated standard deviations, which are 
used as parameter values in the MAGES-GHG model. 
In our model, we will be making the assumption that realizations of random 
variables are independent of each other, in particular that deviations in emissions 
intensity in the energy sector from their expectation are independent of GDP deviations. 
This independence assumption is supported by results from the statistical analysis. 
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3. Theory of intensity targets 
Here we present a formulation of future business-as-usual (BAU) emissions as a function 
of three separate uncertainties, informed by the empirical findings discussed above. This is 
complemented by a generalized formulation of GDP-indexed emission targets. We derive a 
simple rule for optimal indexation of targets, and show the conditions for a 'standard' 
intensity target with one-to-one indexation to reduce net emissions uncertainty compared to 
an absolute target.  
3.1 Future emissions and uncertainties  
We assume that emissions in one part of the economy are linked with GDP, though the 
link is not perfect because emissions intensity also fluctuates. Aggregate uncertainty about 
future business-as-usual (BAU) emissions in the model stems from three separate sources. 
They are: 
- uncertainty in output, measured by GDP and denoted Yi $/yr (where $ means 
constant 2000 US dollars) 
- uncertainty in emissions intensity of output in the 'linked' part of the economy, 
denoted ηi  t/$ (where t means a tonne of CO2-equivalent emissions) and 
- uncertainty in other, not GDP-linked emissions. 
Future BAU emissions in a particular random realization are thus equal to expected BAU 
emissions times adjustments for expectation errors for GDP, emissions intensity and 
emissions in the non-linked sector.  
Formally, realized BAU emissions for country i are 
])1()(1[~ iiYii
b
i
b
i EE ρη εαεεα −+++=           [3.1] 
where  
b
iE
~   Actual BAU emissions in a particular random realization (in t/yr) 
Eib  Expected BAU emissions  
αi  Fixed share of the economy where emissions are linked with GDP (0 ≤ αi ≤ 1) 
εYi  Deviation ('error') of actual GDP from its expectation 
εηi  Deviation of actual emissions intensity from its expectation in the 'linked' 
sector 
ερi  Deviation of actual emissions from expectations in the 'non-linked' sector. 
Throughout this paper, a tilde ~ superscript denotes a particular realization of a random 
variable; whereas no superscript denotes the expectation of a random variable, or a 
8 
parameter. And the disappearance of subscript i or k denotes summing over all countries: ΣiJi 
= ΣkJk =: J, for any variable or parameter J. 
Error terms εYi and εηi are assumed to be additive rather than multiplicative, to keep the 
stochastic analysis tractable. We assume that the error terms are distributed normally and are 
independent of each other, with 
εYi ~ N(0,σYi),  εηi ~ N(0,σηi),  and ερi ~ N(0,σηi) .     [3.2] 
So GDP uncertainty εYi affects emissions in the α part of the economy, but structural 
shifts and other random influences (εηi) also play a role here; while in other parts of the 
economy (1-α), emissions are completely independent of GDP and subject to random shocks 
ερi. 
The σ parameters are measures of the degree of uncertainty. For numerical calibration, 
we use empirical estimates of the standard deviation of forecast errors for each variable 
described above. Uncertainty about emissions intensity is greater than about GDP (σηi > σYi), 
uncertainty in non-OECD (developing, or 'Southern' countries) is greater than in rich 
('Northern') countries, and uncertainty in the non-linked sector (σρi) is of broadly the same 
magnitude as that for emissions intensity in the linked sector, but depends on the particular 
composition of emissions in each country or region.  
Again following empirical findings, we assume that the share αi of emissions linked with 
GDP in each region is equal to the share of the energy sector in total emissions. This 
assumption would obviously need to be refined for detailed country-level analyses. Expected 
BAU emissions Eib are calibrated on the basis of levels reported for the year 2000, forecasts 
by the main energy forecasting agencies, and trend extrapolation for non-energy sector 
emissions. GDP (Yi) and population (Li) are calibrated to recent data, projections and 
estimates from the literature.  The Appendix gives sources and shows all parameter values 
used. 
3.2 Emissions targets  
Next, we define a general flexible target (or permit allocation), defined as a ratio of 
expected future BAU emissions, and adjusted for realized GDP.  
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The (realised) emissions target is 
)1(~ Yii
b
iii ExX εβ+=         [3.3] 
with 
iX
~   realised target (in t/year) 
xi  relative target, as a share of expected future BAU emissions 
βi  degree of indexation of the target to GDP (βi ≥ 0) 
and biE
~  and εYi  are as defined above.  
By how much the target gets adjusted for a deviation in GDP from its expected value 
depends on whether and to what degree targets are indexed. Two obvious special cases are 
Absolute target, with no indexation (βi = 0), hence  biiii ExXX ==~  ;     [3.4] 
Standard intensity target, with one-to-one indexation (βi = 1), hence )1(~ Yibiii ExX ε+= .  [3.5] 
So in our terminology, Kyoto Protocol targets are absolute; and what the literature usually 
refers to as 'intensity targets' are standard intensity targets with one-to-one indexation. 
Partial indexation would of course be possible and is discussed below. Importantly, without 
GDP uncertainty, absolute and intensity targets are the same because they use the same xi; 
the popular view that intensity targets are inherently less stringent than absolute targets is 
thus unjustified.  
3.3 Optimal intensity targets 
Since the error term εYi appears in both realised BAU emissions and intensity targets, 
target indexation changes the variability of the effort implied by the target (the difference 
between BAU emissions and the target): 
E~bi – X
~
i = Ebi – Xi + N
~
Ei,  hence  E
~b – X~ = Eb – X + N~E  ,   [3.6] 
where a country's net emissions uncertainty (net of any neutralising effect of the index βi) is  
N~Ei := [(αi – βixi)εYi+αiεηi+(1– αi)ερi] Ebi .      [3.7] 
The expectation of squared net emissions uncertainty is also important: 
DEi := E[N
~
Ei
2] = [(αi – βixi)2σYi2 + αi2σηi2 + (1–αi)2σρi2] Ebi2  .   [3.8] 
The expected global net benefit of abatement is maximised when squared net emissions 
uncertainty DEi is minimised for all countries (as shown in PJ). This occurs when GDP-
related uncertainty σYi is fully neutralised, which is achieved by setting βi such that all 
0=− iii xβα . This in turn leads to our rule for optimal indexation of intensity targets: 
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Optimal indexation of emissions targets to GDP means  
iii x/
* αβ =  for all i.          [3.9] 
Thus, the optimal degree of indexation depends on the share of total emissions linked with 
GDP, as well as the relative stringency of the target commitment.  
This allows us to define an 
Optimal intensity target with  ])/(1[~ Yiii
b
iii xExX εα+=  .   [3.10] 
For some countries, the share of emissions linked with GDP αi may be greater than the 
target expressed as a share of BAU emissions, xi. That is, an optimal intensity target may be 
super-indexed to GDP ( 1* >iβ ), a possibility which will be realised for several countries in 
our empirical analysis. 
Our finding that not just the degree of GDP-emissions linkage, but also the stringency of 
the target matters for the optimal degree of indexation, is in contrast to most earlier analyses 
on intensity targets which looked only at the emissions-GDP correlation, though it tallies 
with other recent work.6 Our simple formula for optimal indexation should help bring 
conceptual clarity, including about bounds for indexation: optimal target design may well 
imply super-indexation, and there is no reason why indexation should be capped at a factor 
of one.  
3.4 Does GDP indexation reduce uncertainty? 
From [3.8], target indexation reduces uncertainty DEi if  
22)( iiii x αβα <−         [3.11]. 
So from [3.10], optimal intensity targets are always expected to reduce uncertainty (unless αi 
= 0 when optimal intensity and absolute targets coincide). 
The impact of standard intensity targets by contrast is ambiguous, because they 
undercompensate for GDP-related fluctuations in emissions in cases where βi* > 1, and 
overcompensate where βi* < 1. However, with βi = 1, [3.11] holds whenever 
iix α2)0( << ,        [3.12] 
so standard intensity targets are expected to reduce uncertainty, unless αi, the degree of 
GDP-emissions linkage, is very small compared to xi, the stringency of the target. 
                                                          
6 In a rather different analytical framework, Sue Wing et al. (2005, p.27) found that to reduce variability 
in abatement burden in an economy with steady economic growth, "… stringent emission targets should 
be implemented using intensity limits, while lax targets should employ absolute limits."  
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4. The MAGES model for emissions trading with flexible targets 
To simulate the performance of intensity targets, we use the MAGES (Mechanisms for 
Abating Global Emissions under Stochasticity) model, a new partial equilibrium, stochastic 
model of global emissions trading under uncertainty.  The model includes representation of 
uncertain future emissions and flexible targets as described in Section 3, costs and benefits 
from emissions abatement and trading, and risk aversion that influences countries' decisions 
about the stringency of commitments that they are willing to take on.  Expectations of 
random variables are computed algebraically, rather than approximated through repeated 
runs of a deterministic model, allowing numerical optimisation in the simulation model. 
In this application, the model is calibrated for a global, post-Kyoto climate treaty, 
covering all greenhouse gases and taking effect in the year 2020 – this calibration we refer to 
as MAGES-GHG.  We have chosen to divide the world into 18 regions or countries, just 
known as `countries'. 5 are high-income countries known together as `the North', while 13 
are low-income ones (`South').   Our choice both represents the main players in global 
climate policy as single countries (such as the USA, EU, China and India), and allows 
detailed analysis for selected developing countries. 
 Here we briefly describe the structure of the model and its empirical calibration for the 
global greenhouse case.  For more detail on conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of the 
MAGES model, see PJ; and for details on the empirical calibration of MAGES-GHG, again 
see the Appendix. 
4.1 Abatement costs and benefits, and permit trading 
The abatement treaty grants a flexible permit allocation {X~i} defined in [3.3] to all 
countries.  Perfect enforcement in the global permit market makes abated emissions equal the 
target only globally: 
 E~ = X~,  hence global abatement Q~ = E~b – X~.    [4.1] 
The market price of a permit is p~, and a country's emissions trading (ET) revenue is 
 R~i := p
~[X~i-E
~b
i + Q
~
i(p
~)],  with  R~ ≡ 0  automatically.    [4.2] 
 
Country i's net benefit from ET compared to no abatement anywhere7 is defined as 
 A~i   := B
~
i – C
~
i  $/yr, where       [4.3]8 
                                                          
7 By comparing ET with no abatement anywhere, rather than with no abatement by i while all other 
countries abate according to the treaty, we are setting aside the problem of free riding; see also 4.3 below. 
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 B~i(Q
~)  := ViQ
~ – ½Wi(Q
~)2 + R~i,  Vi  $/t > 0,  Wi  $.yr/t2 > 0,  [4.4] 
is i's dollar-valued benefit B~i of global abatement Q
~, including its ET revenue. We 
include valuation of (or benefits from) global abatement in order to be able to determine the 
optimal level of abatement, in the vein of the RICE model (Nordhaus and Yang 1996).  
The cost of i's own abatement Q~i is  
 C~i(Q
~
i) := ½Q
~
i
2/Mi + Q
~
iεCi 
  = ½Q~i2/Mi + Q
~
iN
~
Ci/Mi,  with  N
~
Ci := MiεCi .    [4.5] 
The marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve is then linear9, and uncertain: 
 C~i′(Q~i) = Q~i/Mi + εCi,        [4.6] 
Here εCi is Weitzman's (1974) 'pure unbiased [stochastic] shift' in the MAC. We assume 
E[εCi] = 0, E[εCi2] =: σCi2, and εCi is independent of all other uncertainties.10  Hence from 
[4.3], [4.4] and [4.5], realised net benefit is 
 A~i = ViQ
~ – ½Wi(Q
~)2 + R~i – ½Q
~
i
2/Mi – Q
~
iN
~
Ci/Mi.    [4.7] 
A similar formula applies to the Unilateral case, denoted by the superscript U. Under 
unilateralism, each country decides on its own abatement effort in isolation, and there is no 
trading revenue: 
 A~Ui := ViQ
~U – ½Wi(Q
~U)2 – ½(Q~Ui)2/Mi – Q
~U
iN
~
Ci/Mi.    [4.8] 
We do not model uncertainties in the benefit from global abatement, as under our 
independence assumptions, they would not affect the comparison of expected net benefit 
across mechanisms (though could perhaps have a minor effect on expected payoff).  Stavins 
(1996), using a neglected result in Weitzman, noted that this convenient result does not hold 
if benefit and cost uncertainties are correlated. However, there is no reason for such 
correlation in the greenhouse case. 
The abatement potentials {Mi} in [4.5] are calibrated for energy-derived CO2 on the 
basis of structural characteristics of each country, and these relationship in turn are taken 
                                                                                                                                                                          
8 In a second-best world, this simple net benefit formula should be amended to allow for the marginal cost of 
public funds being greater than unity (Quirion 2004).  Like several other features such as information and 
enforcement costs, this remains for further work, but it will in any case have little effect on the relative 
performance of absolute, standard intensity and optimal intensity targets as reported here. 
9 The assumption of quadratic cost curves and thus linear MACs is necessary to keep the stochastic 
analysis tractable. Unless levels of abatement are very high (which they are not in our empirical 
application), such linearisation does not greatly change estimates of total costs compared to empirically 
estimated MAC functions with a typical degree of convexity.  
10  In practice, deviations in abatement costs from their expectations may well be correlated to a degree with 
deviations from expected emissions intensity. Nevertheless, a large share of MAC uncertainty would stem 
from not knowing in advance the aggregate responsiveness of greenhouse gas emitters to price signals, 
independent of future emissions levels and intensity.  
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from published results from computable general equilibrium models; while parameters for 
abatement costs outside the energy sector are calibrated with reference to other studies (see 
Appendix). The degree of uncertainty about abatement costs {σCi} can be gleaned by 
comparing MAC estimates from different models (Weyant 1999), indicating substantial 
uncertainty about abatement opportunities and costs.  Calibration of the benefit parameters 
{Vi} and {Wi} in [4.4] is discussed further below. 
To maximise its financial benefit from ET, each country chooses abatement Q~i to equate 
its MAC C~i′ to the permit price p~, which gives 
 Q~i = p
~Mi – N
~
Ci,  and hence      [4.9] 
 p~ = (Eb-X+N~E+N
~
C)/M,  with expectation    [4.10] 
 p = (Eb-X)/M.        [4.11] 
[4.10] clarifies an important reason for choosing a multi-country model.  It is not just 
each country's own uncertainty that affects its position under emissions trading, but 
uncertainty in all other participating countries as well, transmitted through the realised permit 
price p~.  How much this deviates from its expectation p depends on deviations from 
expectations N~E in BAU emissions and N
~
C in MACs in all countries.  So a flexible target 
that neutralises some uncertainty in one country has flow-through effects for all others in the 
permit market. 
4.2 Payoff and risk aversion 
We assume that country i assesses the desirability of a move from Unilateral to Treaty 
abatement by calculating its expected payoff from the move, which is best viewed as 
comprising three steps.  
First, i's realised gain from the move is defined as the difference in realised net benefits: 
  G~i := A
~
i – A
~U
i.        [4.12] 
Then its realised payoff from the move is a strictly concave function of gain:  
  U~i := G
~
i + zi(1-e–rG
~
i)  $/yr;       zi  $/yr > 0 ,     r yr/$ > 0.  [4.13] 
This captures i's aversion to risk, by weighting potential losses more heavily than potential 
gains, in line with what we perceive to be the political psychology of international treaties. 
Finally, its expected payoff is then, since all the errors have normal distributions with zero 
means, 
  Ui := ∫R4n [G~i(ε) + zi(1-e–rG
~
i(ε))] [e-½Σ[(εYi/σYi)
2+(εηi/σηi)2+(ερi/σρi)2+(εCi/σCi)2]  
    / (2π)2nΠ (σYiσηiσρiσCi)] dε,  with 
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              ε := (εYi,…εYn, εηi,…εηn, ερi,…ερn, εCi,…εCn).    [4.14] 
 
This will be less than expected gain Gi, by virtue of the positive parameters zi and r.  
Importantly, the characterisation in [4.12]-[4.14] assumes that the payoff a country perceives 
is framed solely in terms of the financial and environmental consequences of the treaty, not 
the economy overall.  We discuss this framing effect further in Section 6.1. 
Country i's expected (risk-adjusted) payoff from ET instead of Unilateralism, showing 
functional dependences only on policy choice parameters x:= {xi} and β:= {βi}, and 
uncertainty measures σ = {σYi, σηi, σρi, σCi} can then be shown to be (see PJ): 
 Ui(x,β,σ) ≈ A-i + Fi – AUi + zi(1–e½r2Γi – r(A
-
i+Fi –AUi)),      [4.15]11 
where 
 A-i(x)  := VipM + ½p2(Mi –WiM2) – p(1-xi)Ebi  $/yr;   [4.16] 
 Fi(x,β,σ) := – (1/M)DEi – ½(Wi–Mi/M2)DE 
    + [(1/2Mi)–1/M]DCi + ½(Mi/M2)DC;   [4.17] 
 AUi(σ)  := ViQU – ½Wi(1+WiMi)[(QU)2+DC/(1+ΣWkMk)2] – ½Vi2Mi 
    + ½DCi/Mi + ½ViWiMiQU – ½WiDCi/(1+ΣWkMk),   [4.18] 
with QU := ΣViMi / (1+ΣWkMk);       [4.19] 
 Γi(x,β,σ) := (p – HEi)2DEi + HEi2Σ-iDEk + (p – HCi)2DCi + HCi2Σ-iDCk,    [4.20] 
with HTEi(x) := (pTMi –Ebi+Xi)/M + Vi – WipTM  $/t,              [4.21] 
  HTCi(x) := (pTMi –Ebi+XTi)/M  $/t,                          [4.22] 
and  p = (Eb–X)/M as in [4.11].   
                                                          
11 The approximation here arises from using the expectation Fi instead of its realisation value F
~
i (not 
shown here) in the exponent of the expectation integral [4.14], in order that the integral can be computed 
analytically; and from using the expectation AUi instead of both occurrences of its realisation A
~U
i in [4.14]. 
As explained in PJ, the approximation is acceptable for the purpose here, particularly as we infer risk 
aversion parameters (see below) and this inference incorporates the approximation in [4.15]. 
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4.3 Optimality, the equity criterion, and endogenous targets 
For the case of a global climate treaty analysed here, the MAGES model is solved 
numerically as a cooperative game, by selecting both the overall size X and distribution {xi} 
of expected targets, so that 
–  expected global payoff U is maximised, subject to:        [4.23] 
–  an equity criterion that all countries have the same expected payoff per person from 
the Treaty:  Ui/Li = Uk/Lk  for all i, k, where Li, Lk are countries' populations.  [4.24] 
The Reference Case, to which results for all other scenarios will be compared, is the 
outcome of applying [4.23] and [4.24] to emissions trading with absolute targets. In 
simulations with optimal intensity targets, we jointly optimise targets xi and indexation 
βi.  
Criterion [4.24] does not specify a direct rule for target distribution; so under a target 
type that neutralises some of the uncertainty, payoff will be greater.  In turn this leads to 
more abatement by way of tighter targets (a lower X), i.e. endogenous targets.  Of the many 
proposed rules for, and subsequent analyses of, target differentiation or `burden sharing' in 
greenhouse gas control (see for example Rose et al. 1998 or Berk and den Elzen 2001) most 
are exogenous to the choice of abatement mechanism; and none depend on the degree of 
uncertainty that countries are exposed to. In our analysis, both the overall stringency of the 
treaty and the differentiation of commitments between countries are endogenous and differ 
according to target type, parameters and the simulation scenario chosen. We can thus model 
how better mechanism design may affect environmental outcomes from a treaty.   
An egalitarian criterion such as [4.24] may seem unrealistic in terms of international 
politics.  However, in sensitivity analysis in Section 5, we find the choice of equity criterion 
makes little difference to the relative merits of absolute and intensity targets.  Equity 
constraints are fulfilled solely through adjusting targets xi, which we feel politically more 
realistic than cash transfers, as assumed for example by Bohm and Carlén (2002).  
As a participation constraint, we demand only that each country's payoff under the treaty 
is greater than if there was no treaty at all (Ui > 0), which in practice is satisfied for all 
simulations. This is conceptually different from the more demanding 'no-free-ride' condition, 
which underlies the generally pessimistic results from non-cooperative models of multi-party 
environmental treaties (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993, Barrett 1994). Instead, we have 
implicitly assumed that political factors can prevent free-riding (Eckersley 2004). A similar 
approach of modelling permit allocations that fulfil individual rationality in the sense of each 
party being better off than in the non-cooperative state, while not preventing free-riding as 
such, was taken by Germain and Van Steenberghe (2003). The MAGES model can be 
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extended to non-cooperative situations and to analyse free-riding incentives, but this is left 
for further work. 
4.4 Calibration of benefit and risk aversion parameters 
The valuation parameters {Vi} are calibrated in order to conform with broad 
observations about the international debate about burden sharing. As explained further 
in the Appendix, relative per capita valuations {Vi/Li} are assumed to be a function of 
per capita income and historical responsibility for greenhouse emissions, yielding much 
higher {Vi/Li} in rich countries, but roughly an even split in total valuation V between 
North and South, broadly in line with climate change damage estimates from the 
literature.  Wi, the slope of the GHG marginal benefit curve, is chosen to be a small and 
constant share of Vi, resulting in a slight upward slope of the marginal benefit curve, in 
line with the well-recognised notion that due to the nature of greenhouse gases as a 
long-lived stock pollutant, the marginal damage curve is almost flat (Pizer 2002).  
Overall global valuation parameters V and W are chosen so that a global climate treaty 
results in a halving of global emissions growth between 2000 and 2020, compared to 
BAU emissions growth, in our Reference Case scenario. 
In calibrating the risk aversion parameters {zi} and r in [4.13], we first choose all zi 
= z/yi, for some constant z and yi = Yi/Li, per capita GDP. The 1/yi factor matches the 
stylised fact that uncertainty matters more in poor countries, and serves our purpose to 
capture the essential features of the global climate policy debate and broad differences 
across countries.  Parameters z and r are then calibrated so that risk aversion results in 
significantly less stringent commitments under uncertainty, but without stifling 
agreement altogether.  In the default calibration z = 1; while r, the payoff concavity 
parameter, is chosen so that global abatement in the Reference Case is one third lower 
than it would be without risk aversion.   
 A more comprehensive approach to calibrating both benefit and risk aversion 
parameters might be a survey of expert opinion in each country along the lines of 
Weitzman (2001), but that remains for further work. 
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5. Performance of intensity targets 
The theoretical analysis modeled how optimal intensity targets reduce uncertainty 
and improve a treaty's environmental outcome as well as the payoff to participating 
countries, while standard intensity targets may or may not reduce uncertainty. But how 
large are the potential improvements? How important is optimal indexation? What are 
the key factors influencing the performance of intensity targets? This section explores 
these questions empirically through simulations using the MAGES-GHG model. We 
briefly describe the Reference Case, discuss aggregate and country-level results for the 
comparative performance of intensity targets, and then present alternative scenarios and 
sensitivity analysis. 
5.1 Reference Case with absolute targets 
The Reference Case assumes that all countries participate in a cap-and-trade 
agreement with absolute targets (no indexation, βi = 0), covering all greenhouse gas 
emissions. Like all other scenarios, the absolute emission targets used for the reference 
scenario are chosen to satisfy [4.23] and [4.24], that is to maximise expected global 
(risk-adjusted) payoff from a full ET treaty subject to per capita payoff being equalised 
across all countries. The reference scenario is not meant as a prediction of what a future 
climate treaty would look like, but merely as a point of comparison for alternative target 
types.  
Global abated emissions (E) in the Reference Case grow by 16% from 2000 to 
2020, compared to a projected increase of 32% (Eb) under BAU.  This is equivalent to a 
reduction of 12% below global BAU emissions (x = 0.88), as shown in Table I. The 
Reference Case thus describes a significant, but arguably not wholly unrealistic level of 
effort for a post-Kyoto climate treaty. The expected amount of abatement undertaken 
under the treaty is 6.5 Gt/yr, which compares to expected abatement in the unilateral 
case of around 1 Gt/yr, calculated from [4.19].12  
The expected permit price p from [4.11], equal to expected the marginal cost of 
abatement in all countries, is 15 $/t, well within the range of estimates of the marginal 
damage of greenhouse gas emissions in the literature (Tol 2005), and comparable to 
prices paid in 2005 for permits under the EU CO2 emissions trading scheme. Global 
dollar-valued global gain G from the climate treaty, defined as the expected sum of 
                                                          
12 The magnitude of abatement in the unilateral case, where each region maximises their own expected 
benefit without regard to decisions by others, depends on the degree of aggregation. In a regionally more 
aggregated model, unilateral abatement would be larger, because each region captures a greater share of 
external (global) benefits of their abatement action.  
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[4.12], is 53 billion $/yr. With risk adjustment, this translates into payoff U (likewise 
from [4.13]) of around 44 billion $/yr. The expected global financial cost of abatement, 
C from summing [4.5], is 50 billion $/year, and thus well below 0.1% of projected 
global GDP, which reassures us that this is an acceptable application of a partial 
equilibrium model. Compared to the outcome under certainty equivalence, global 
abatement (and, by virtue of linear marginal abatement cost curves, the permit price) in 
the reference scenario is exactly one third lower, reflecting our choice of the risk 
aversion parameter r.  
Table I Reference Case: Global results and comparison with certainty 
equivalence 
 
Reference Case: 
Absolute targets 
under uncertainty 
and risk aversion 
(expectation results) 
Certainty 
equivalence 
Expected global values of: 
Target (permits) as share of emissions, x 0.88 0.82 
Permit price p ($/t) 15.33 23.00 
Abatement Q (Gt/yr) 6.53 9.80 
Gain G (G$/yr) 53.4 100.5 
Payoff U (G$/yr) 44.1 101.2 
Note: Gain G and payoff U are defined as improvements compared to the outcome under 
unilateral action by each country. Results under unilateralism: Net benefit AU = 24.5 G$/yr, 
abatement QU = 1.04 Gt/yr. 
 
Targets in the reference scenario are strongly differentiated between countries, with 
stricter targets applying where relative valuation of abatement is higher, abatement is 
cheaper, and uncertainty or risk aversion lower.  On the whole, high-income Northern 
countries have more stringent relative targets than Southern countries in our Reference 
Case, as shown in Figure 1. Most Southern countries abate their emissions below their 
targets, and sell the freed-up permits.  
Table II shows a summary of targets and emissions trading flows for the 
North/South country groups. When expressed as a proportion of base year (2000) 
emissions, it is evident that Southern countries overall get allocated ‘growth targets’ 
under our reference scenario, that is, their permit allocation is greater than their current 
emissions, leaving room for future emissions growth.  
The South accounts for over three quarters of global abatement, on account of its 
greater share in global emissions and higher abatement potential, coupled with our 
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assumption that all abatement options for all greenhouse gases can be harnessed 
efficiently – which may be a rather optimistic assumption given real-world institutional 
constraints and measurement problems (Victor 2001). The South as a group would 
receive substantial permit revenue, almost offsetting their overall abatement cost.  
 
Figure 1 Reference Case: Targets and actual emissions after abatement, 
relative to BAU emissions 
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
Un
ite
d S
tat
es
Eu
rop
e
Ja
pa
n
Au
str
ali
a
Ca
na
da
&N
Z
Ru
ss
ia
Ch
ina Ind
ia
Br
az
il
Ar
ge
nti
na
Me
xic
o
Ko
rea
 (S
.)
Ind
on
es
ia
So
uth
-E
as
t A
sia
So
uth
 Af
ric
a
No
rth
ern
 Af
ric
a
Mi
dd
le 
Ea
st
Re
st 
of 
the
 w
orl
d
Sh
ar
e 
of
 B
A
U
 e
m
is
si
on
s Targets
Actual emissions
 
 
Table II Reference Case: Targets, abatement and trading  
Target as a 
share of 
BAU 
Target as 
share of 
2000 
emissions 
Expected 
reduction 
commitment 
(Gt/yr) 
Expected 
abatement 
(Gt/yr) 
Expected 
permits sales 
(Gt/yr) 
Region  Xi/Ebi =xi Xi/Ei2000  Ebi-Xi Qi Qi-(Ebi-Xi) 
North 0.79 0.93 3.81 1.40 -2.40 
South  0.92 1.30 2.73 5.13 2.40 
Global 0.88 1.16 6.53 6.53 0.00 
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5.2 Intensity targets with fixed levels 
We model two types of intensity targets and compare them to absolute targets:  
- standard intensity targets with one-to-one indexation for all countries i, 
characterized by one-to-one indexation to GDP (βi  = 1 as in [3.5]); and 
- optimal intensity targets, where βi* = αi / xi   for all i, so uncertainty due to 
fluctuations in GDP is fully neutralized, as in [3.10]. 
In our first set of simulations for both target types, reported in Table III, we hold 
target levels xi (and thereby expected total abatement Q and the permit price p) fixed at 
Reference Case levels, but introduce target indexation. 
The expected global gain G increases by 13% and 20% respectively under standard 
and optimal intensity targets for all countries. Expressed in dollar terms, this is 
equivalent to an increase of up to 10 billion $/yr – keeping in mind though that 
estimates of absolute magnitudes depend on our assumptions about the overall extent 
and ambition of the treaty. Note that this estimated improvement in expected gain under 
fixed target levels does not depend on our assumptions about risk aversion and payoff; 
it derives directly from reduced cost uncertainty. 
Increases in (risk-adjusted) expected payoff U from target indexation are 
significantly larger than in gain G, as they also take account of 'psychological' effects of 
a reduced risk of incurring losses under emissions trading. 
Table III Exogenous intensity targets: Global results 
 Absolute targets 
(all βi=0) 
Standard intensity 
targets (all βi =1) 
Optimal intensity 
targets  
(all βi*  = αi/xi) 
Expected values of: 
Abatement Q (Gt/yr) 6.53 6.53 6.53 
Gain G (billion $/yr) 53.4 60.2 63.9 
Payoff U (billion $/yr) 44.1 55.6 62.3 
Increase compared to absolute targets: 
Abatement Q - 0.0% 0.0% 
Gain G - 12.6% 19.6% 
Payoff U  - 26.0% 41.1% 
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5.3 Endogenous intensity targets  
Now, we determine target levels endogenously by maximizing global payoff subject 
to equal per capita distribution of payoffs. With intensity targets neutralizing some or all 
of the GDP-related uncertainty, greater payoff can be achieved, at a different optimal 
vector {xi} of country targets. Importantly, this gives us the chance to assess to what 
degree reduced uncertainty through more flexible target design might result in more 
stringent environmental commitments. 
Figure 2 shows the connection between target design, payoff and stringency of 
targets. Expected global payoff (subject to equal per capita payoff) is plotted as a 
function of expected global abatement, for all three types of targets. Expected payoff is 
greater under intensity than under absolute targets for any given level of global 
abatement, and maximum expected payoff is achieved at a greater level of abatement. 
With standard intensity targets, expected global abatement increases to 7.2 Gt/yr, 
from 6.5 to under absolute targets, a 10% increase (Table IV).  This improvement of 0.7 
Gt/yr is about in the same order of magnitude as total emissions from countries such as 
Korea, Mexico or Australia.  Payoff from the treaty, our main welfare measure, is 
increased by more than a quarter.   
Under optimal intensity targets, significantly bigger improvements are possible, 
because standard one-to-one indexation will on average over- or undercompensate for 
fluctuations in GDP.  Expected global abatement is 7.7 Gt/yr, around 17% greater than 
under absolute targets. Expected (risk-adjusted) payoff under optimal intensity targets 
for all countries is increased by almost half, or around 20 billion $/yr, compared to 
without target indexation.  
Both payoff and expected gain (not adjusted for risk aversion) are greater under 
endogenous intensity targets, compared to the corresponding scenarios with fixed 
targets. This is because in addition to part of the uncertainty being neutralized, the level 
of abatement is now closer to what it would be under certainty equivalence, which 
would yield the greatest possible gain.  
Qualitatively, these results hold also if only some countries take on intensity targets. 
For example, in a simulation where only Southern, developing countries have (optimal) 
intensity targets, global abatement is increased by 11% (compared to 17% with optimal 
indexation for all countries). Reduced uncertainty is transmitted through less variability 
in the permit price, and under endogenous targets with payoff sharing, all countries 
benefit from reducing the cost of uncertainty in one part of the world.  
These results indicate that intensity targets, particular with optimal indexation, have 
the potential to boost global abatement, if uncertainty does indeed hamper the 
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stringency of the commitments that can be agreed upon; and that target indexation could 
improve welfare even if policymakers were risk-neutral in negotiating a cap-and-trade 
treaty. 
 
Figure 2 Expected global payoff as a function of expected global 
abatement, for three target types 
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Table IV Endogenous intensity targets: Global results 
 Absolute targets 
(all βi=0) 
Standard intensity 
targets (all βi =1) 
Optimal intensity 
targets  
(all βi*  = αi/xi) 
Expected values of: 
Abatement Q (Gt/yr) 6.53 7.20 7.66 
Gain G (billion $/yr) 53.4 64.9 71.8 
Payoff U (billion $/yr) 44.1 56.8 66.0 
Increase compared to absolute targets: 
Abatement Q - 10.2% 17.2% 
Gain G  21.6% 34.5% 
Payoff U  - 28.7% 49.6% 
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5.4 Optimal intensity targets by country  
The degree to which intensity targets can help address uncertainty, and 
consequently make tighter targets possible, differs greatly between countries.  
Neutralising activity-related emissions uncertainty brings the greatest advantage where 
the share of emissions linked with GDP (αi) is large, where uncertainty about future 
GDP (σYi) is large relative to other uncertainties, and where risk aversion (z/yi) is strong. 
These differences are represented in our multi-region model. 
The globally averaged emissions target is 1.2 and 2.1 percentage points more 
stringent under standard and optimal intensity targets than under absolute targets (Table 
V). For Southern (mainly developing) countries as a group, the more significant impact 
comes from moving from standard to optimal intensity targets, rather than moving from 
absolute to standard intensity targets. The reverse situation applies in Northern countries 
as a whole. So optimal indexation plays a much more important role in developing than 
in industrialized countries.  
Why is that so? The answer lies in systematic differences in the degree of 
emissions-GDP linkage αi and relative targets xi between countries, which enter the 
optimality condition βi* = αi / xi. In industrialised countries, fossil fuel combustion – 
which empirical analysis shows to often be linked with economic activity – typically 
accounts for a large share of total greenhouse emissions, so αi  takes on comparatively 
large values. At the same time, these countries get allocated comparatively stringent 
targets, so xi are low. Together, this tends to result in optimal degrees of indexation βi* 
in the broad vicinity of one; and as a result, standard intensity targets with one-to-one 
indexation would already do quite well. 
The move from absolute to standard intensity targets, and on to optimal intensity 
targets, leads to slightly less stringent targets (higher xi) in a number of countries, 
contrary to more stringent commitments in aggregate. This is because reducing the cost 
of uncertainty has disproportionately large effects in some countries, and these gains are 
distributed across all countries under our equity rule, by way of adjusting target 
commitments.  
For several countries, the constrained-optimal target is lower than the share of 
emissions linked with GDP, so super-indexation of targets is optimal (xi < αi  means  
βi* > 1).  Under a reasonably ambitious treaty, this is likely to happen in many advanced 
economies, with Japan’s super-indexation of 1.34 being highest.  Australia and 
Canada/New Zealand, where land-use change and agriculture account for a relatively 
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large share of total emissions, are exceptions among Northern countries, with optimal 
indexation below 1. 
In most developing countries, partial indexation would be optimal. The degree of 
optimal indexation varies greatly, particularly in response to the very different 
emissions profiles found in developing countries. Countries with large non-energy 
sector emissions would generally be best off with very low degrees of indexation. This 
is evident for Indonesia and Brazil, where a large share of emissions stems from 
deforestation, the rate of which is unlikely to move with overall GDP. Here, optimal 
indexation would be very low (as low as 0.2), for a treaty that includes all greenhouse 
gas sources and does not prescribe extremely tight targets for developing countries. 
In these countries, the standard iix α2> , so from [3.12] overcompensation under 
standard intensity targets would actually increase emissions uncertainty. If continuously 
differentiated indexation were not an option and each country only had the dichotomous 
choice between an absolute or a standard intensity target (βi = 0 or 1), then global payoff 
would be maximized if some developing countries had absolute, and the rest intensity 
targets. In the MAGES-GHG model, absolute targets are preferable for Brazil, 
Indonesia, the Rest of the World region (all of which have large emissions from land-
use change) as well as – only just – the South-East Asia region.13 Optimally indexed 
targets would of course be preferable in all countries.  
These results highlight that target indexation must be tailored to individual 
countries' circumstances in order to maximize the potential for neutralizing uncertainty. 
Detailed empirical analysis of the link between fluctuations in GDP and fluctuations in 
emissions, at a disaggregated level in each country, could improve on our comparatively 
rough estimate of αi. Such research would be needed to determine optimal indexation in 
practice.  
                                                          
13 By contrast, Sue Wing et al.(2005) found intensity targets preferable to absolute targets for all six 
developing countries they looked at. This is largely attributable to the fact that they look at historical data 
for CO2 from fossil fuel combustion only, whereas we consider all major greenhouse gas emissions. 
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Table V Endogenous targets by country 
Country (N = 
North) 
Reference 
Case: 
Absolute 
targets  
(βi =0) 
Standard 
intensity 
targets  
(βi =1) 
Optimal 
intensity 
targets  
(βi* =αi/xi) 
Indexation 
under 
optimal 
targets   
 
Share of 
emissions 
linked 
with GDP  
 
 Target relative to BAU emissions (xi) βi* αi 
United States (N) 0.825 0.782 0.780 1.06 0.83 
Europe (N) 0.748 0.720 0.719 1.20 0.86 
Japan (N) 0.733 0.723 0.722 1.34 0.97 
Australia (N) 0.783 0.785 0.785 0.84 0.66 
Canada/NZ (N) 0.807 0.806 0.806 0.76 0.61 
Russia 0.796 0.769 0.768 1.18 0.91 
China 0.998 0.923 0.920 0.83 0.76 
India 0.892 0.909 0.921 0.63 0.58 
Brazil 0.882 0.898 * 0.888 0.26 0.23 
Argentina 0.788 0.792 0.795 0.60 0.48 
Mexico 0.798 0.801 0.805 0.92 0.74 
Korea (S.) 0.811 0.805 0.806 1.14 0.92 
Indonesia 0.918 0.947 * 0.925 0.19 0.18 
South-East Asia 0.881 0.888 * 0.887 0.48 0.43 
South Africa 0.779 0.779 0.781 1.14 0.89 
Northern Africa 0.862 0.874 0.882 0.78 0.69 
Middle East 0.892 0.889 0.891 0.74 0.66 
Rest of the world 0.996 1.055 * 1.006 0.32 0.32 
Aggregates:      
North 0.790 0.759 0.757 1.10 0.83 
South  0.924 0.921 0.909 0.62 0.55 
Global 0.879 0.867 0.858 0.78 0.64 
* : For these countries, the standard intensity target xi exceeds 2αi, and so reduces expected 
payoff compared to the Reference Case (see text). 
Optimal target indexation βi* for regional aggregates is computed by weighting with BAU 
emissions Ebi. 
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5.5 Alternative scenarios and sensitivity analysis  
Here we briefly discuss results from alternative scenarios with different 
assumptions about optimisation objectives and equity rules, and test the sensitivity of 
results to changes in some key parameters. Together, these analyses show that it is an 
empirical question by how much intensity targets could improve the outcome from a 
climate treaty, thus highlighting the need for country-level empirical research in fine-
tuning the design of flexible targets. However, the main conclusions about the 
performance and design of intensity targets are robust. 
Maximizing additional abatement rather than payoff 
In the scenarios presented above, flexible target design gives greater expected 
payoff (which is maximized) and hence higher expected global abatement as a 
corollary. What if instead, countries took expected payoff under absolute targets as a 
reference point, and channeled all improvements from reduced uncertainty into greater 
stringency of commitments? 
Keeping expected payoff from the agreement fixed at U = 44 as under absolute 
targets (and applying our equity rule) results in expected abatement Q of 8.61 and 9.71 
under standard and optimal intensity targets respectively. Compared to Q = 6.53 under 
absolute targets, this means very large increases, of 32% and 49% respectively.  
Note that this would not be rational optimizing behaviour in the world we model; 
rather, it is a rough measure of the maximum environmental benefit theoretically 
attainable from reduced uncertainty. The estimated magnitudes depend strongly on our 
assumptions about risk aversion. 
Equity criteria 
As foreshadowed earlier, our choice of equal per capita payoff as our standard 
equity criterion, as in [4.24], affects target levels and differentiation between countries, 
but makes little difference to the relative assessment of different types. This is because 
the impacts of uncertainty get transmitted through adjustments in targets and through 
the permit price. 
For example, changing to a criterion of equal payoff per $ of GDP, thus giving rich 
countries a much larger share in total payoff, would result in targets implying a 16% 
reduction below BAU for North as a country group, and 10% for South (compared to a 
21% and 8% reduction respectively in the Reference Case). The increases in global 
abatement from standard or optimal intensity targets are 9% and 16% respectively under 
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equal payoff per $ of GDP (compared to 10% and 17% under our standard 
assumptions).  
Uncertainty about GDP 
From [4.15], [4.20] and [3.8], the size of uncertainties about future GDP directly 
affects the performance of intensity targets compared to absolute targets.  To illustrate 
the impact of GDP uncertainties, the main scenarios were re-run with values of the 
uncertainty parameter σYi reduced and increased by one third, compared to the standard 
calibration.14  
Predictably, the less reliable projections of future GDP are, the greater the potential 
role for intensity targets, and the greater the potential improvement from optimal 
indexation. With reduced GDP uncertainty, increases in expected abatement are just 5% 
and 8% for standard and optimal indexation respectively; while under greater GDP 
uncertainty, respective improvements are 14% and 27% (again compared to 10% and 
17% in the standard calibration).  
Risk aversion  
If risk aversion is stronger, the advantage of intensity targets is also greater; if 
parties are less averse to the risk of losses, then designing mechanisms to mitigate risk 
is less important also. Figure 3 shows the improvements from optimal intensity targets 
as function of risk aversion.  The greater the degree of risk aversion, the greater the 
increase in expected global abatement under endogenous targets – ranging from no 
change to improvements over 20%. Note that expected dollar-valued gain G is greater 
with intensity targets even under risk neutrality, as it is a function of net uncertainty.  
GDP–emissions linkage 
The strength of linkage between fluctuations in emissions and in economic activity 
determines whether and by how much GDP indexation can improve on absolute targets. 
In sensitivity analysis, we first assume that only half (instead of all) of energy sector 
emissions are linked with GDP, resulting in lower values for αi across the board.  In this 
case, standard intensity targets overall perform worse than absolute targets, because 
they badly overcompensate for fluctuations in GDP (Table 6).  Optimal intensity 
targets, at low levels of indexation, still improve the outcome compared to absolute 
targets.  If however the overall emissions-GDP linkage is stronger than in the standard 
scenario (here, by assuming that half of non-energy sector emissions are linked with 
GDP, in addition to all of the energy sector), standard intensity targets perform very 
                                                          
14 For comparability, the risk aversion parameter r was adjusted so that the overall impact of uncertainty 
in the reference case remained the same. All other parameters remained unchanged. 
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well.  Optimal indexation then improves the outcome compared to standard intensity 
targets only marginally. 
A post-Kyoto treaty might well exclude sources of greenhouse gas emissions that 
are highly variable and difficult to monitor, such as tropical deforestation; and many 
less developed countries, where 'linked' emissions tend to constitute a smaller share of 
the total, may not be in a position to take on emissions targets and take part in permit 
trading, due to institutional constraints. Overall, GDP and emissions covered by the 
treaty would then tend to be linked more closely, as fuel combustion emissions play a 
comparatively greater role. On the other hand, it is likely that at least some emissions 
sources within the energy sector are in fact largely independent of GDP (such as energy 
use for heating and cooling), contrary to our simplifying assumption in calibrating αi. In 
turn, the performance of standard intensity targets for the energy sector would not be as 
good as indicated in this sensitivity analysis.  
Figure 3 Sensitivity analysis on risk aversion (for optimal intensity 
targets) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table VI Sensitivity analysis of  GDP–emissions linkage 
 Standard 
calibration 
Less linkage Greater linkage 
Range of αi 0.18 to 0.97 0.09 to 0.485 0.59 to 0.98 
Increase in global abatement compared to absolute targets 
Std intensity targets 10% -15% 19% 
Optimal intensity targets 17% 7% 20% 
Note: Risk aversion parameter r is adjusted to preserve the Reference Case criterion of a one 
third reduction in abatement in the Reference Case compared to certainty equivalence.  
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6. Applicability and drawbacks of target indexation 
We have presented a theoretical and empirical argument that intensity targets could 
yield substantial improvements compared to absolute targets, in an international 
greenhouse treaty. Our model describes a world where uncertainty presents a problem 
because of cost uncertainties within the treaty (rather than the economy as a whole), 
where some degree of year-by-year uncertainty about overall allowable emissions under 
the treaty is of no consequence, and implementation issues are ignored. Here we discuss 
whether relaxing these assumptions could weaken or even reverse the case for intensity 
targets, and discuss how applicable intensity targets might be in a real-world policy 
context. 
6.1 Pro-cyclical effects and framing of uncertainty 
Linking permit allocations with GDP can reduce uncertainty within an emissions 
trading treaty, but has a pro-cyclical effect that may be undesirable: In the event of an 
economic downturn, permit allocations would be cut back, at a time when countries 
may least be able to afford losing net revenue from permit trading. 
In the model we have assumed that the (risk-adjusted) payoff a country perceives 
from joining an emissions trading treaty is framed as a function of just the financial and 
environmental consequences of joining the treaty, not of any broader economic 
stabilisation. This would seem logical from the point of view of the treaty negotiators 
and industries that will be subject to emissions control, but from the point of the view of 
the country, should not the broader effect of overall economic uncertainty on welfare be 
taken into account?   
Which frame of reference to use for negotiation is a matter for political and 
psychological choice.  Given the existence of emissions trading, an absolute emissions 
target is not an absolute constraint on GDP growth, but a financial stabiliser – though a 
very modest one, as it turns out.  From this broader perspective, intensity targets 
diminish a useful stabilisation effect! However, our reading of the debate is that 
governments and negotiators are much more concerned about uncertainty within a treaty 
and their obligations under it. Potential impacts on domestic industries' competitiveness 
have played a strong role in the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, but arguments of overall 
economic stabilization were rarely heard. 
The relative magnitudes of GDP and total permit value may help explain this.  The 
value of permits is small relative to the size of economies – in our calibration, total 
permit value is around 1% of global GDP – so changes in permit allocations would only 
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amount to a small fraction of the change in GDP that triggers them.  We think the view 
that emissions trading could act as a stabilizer or otherwise of broader economic 
fluctuations, and should be designed with this in mind, will not hold sway with 
policymakers as long as the magnitude of financial flows under emissions trading is 
small relative to the economy overall. 
However, the stabilization argument may be more applicable for industry level 
emissions targets, and where financial flows under permit trading can account for a 
significant share of the overall size of the operation; for example for firm-level CO2 
permit trading among electricity generators. 
6.2 Shifting uncertainty to emission levels 
By allowing country's target levels to respond to realized GDP, the overall amount 
of emissions allowable under a treaty with intensity targets is not fixed; in other words, 
some uncertainty is shifted away from costs and on to emissions levels. This has been 
put forth as an argument against target indexation (Dudek and Golub 2003).  
We have opted to set this issue aside in our modelling because in practice, 
variability in emissions as a result of target indexation would have a negligible effect on 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, and because there is no identifiable 
threshold that emissions should not exceed. All that climate science can tell 
policymakers is that the lower greenhouse gas emissions, the better. Greenhouse gases 
are a stock pollutant with long decay times, and the complexity of atmospheric systems 
so far has precluded identification of particular threshold levels. The situation might be 
quite different for other pollutants. 
It is also important to note that intensity targets increase uncertainty about 
environmental impacts only insofar as fluctuations do not cancel out between countries. 
For a global scheme, only a global boom would result in higher-than-expected 
emissions under the treaty. A much more prevalent pattern is for some countries to grow 
slower than expected while others grow faster, with offsetting effects on activity-
indexed permit allocations overall. Further, any under- or overshooting of expected 
global target amounts could be compensated for if targets were periodically re-
negotiated.   
6.3 Complexity and window-dressing 
By bringing in play an additional variable for permit allocation, intensity targets 
create greater complexity and could reduce transparency. Monitoring, verification and 
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administration of the trading scheme would be more complicated, and there may be 
complications with using GDP measures as an activity index, especially with regard to 
inflation proofing (Müller and Müller-Fürstenberger 2003). Further, differentiating the 
degree of indexation would in practice pose significant technical and political 
challenges: Neither determining the optimal degree of indexation, nor negotiating such 
differentiation between countries, will be easy. 
There is also a danger that the very framing of targets in terms of intensity could be 
used to undermine the environmental stringency of commitments at a political level, in 
a highly charged and often poorly informed public debate. A reduction in future 
greenhouse intensity 'looks' more stringent than its equivalent expressed as a change in 
absolute emissions, because emissions intensity in most countries declines anyway, and  
this can be used for political window-dressing. For example, the Bush administration 
announced a goal of an 18% decline in US greenhouse emissions intensity from 2002 to 
2012. This is close to the expected business-as-usual path, and implies a substantial 
increase in emission levels, despite it being framed as a 'reduction' (in intensity).  
These downsides could be important, and the potential benefits from intensity 
targets have to be weighed carefully against them. Nevertheless, we believe that the 
advantages in reducing uncertainty through intensity targets may well outweigh 
increased complexity. Window-dressing can be dealt with by presenting intensity 
targets in terms of their expected emission levels, or as absolute targets with an 
adjustment term, as in [3.3].   
6.4 Intensity targets for developing countries in a post-Kyoto treaty 
Our quantitative analysis shows that intensity targets could make it more attractive 
for all countries to join an international climate treaty – in line with the original 
motivation behind proposals for target indexation, which was to encourage developing 
countries to participate in the Kyoto Protocol or a successor treaty (see Introduction). 
Would the improvements be large enough to make a difference to the participation 
decision by developing countries? 
Increases in expected dollar-valued payoff estimated here are large, both in 
percentage as well as in absolute terms. However, the changes in target levels are more 
modest: the move from absolute to optimal intensity targets shifts South's aggregate 
endogenous target by 1.5 percentage points (on top of South's reduction commitment of 
7.6 percentage points in the reference case), as readily seen from Table V. If all gains 
from lower uncertainty were used specifically to offer more lenient targets to 
developing countries, with commensurately tighter commitments in rich countries, the 
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changes would be of a similar magnitude. Flexible target design might thus be able to 
'tip the balance' in particular cases where countries are nearly indifferent between taking 
on a given target or not, but the improvements are unlikely to be large enough to 
overcome more deep-seated problems of international equity, cooperation and politics. 
Of the global potential gains from intensity targets, most would accrue from 
applying target indexation in developing countries, given that uncertainty (and probably 
risk aversion) is greatest there. However, the downsides and practical difficulties of 
target indexation are also likely to be most acute in less developed countries. So overall, 
intensity targets may in fact be best suited to industrializing, rather less developed 
countries.  
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7. Conclusions 
Uncertainty about future paths of economic and emissions growth can be an 
important obstacle to effective emissions trading schemes, as such schemes create 
uncertainty about the cost of complying with emissions targets.  Intensity targets, where 
permit allocations are linked to future uncertain GDP, have been proposed as a means to 
reduce cost uncertainty by compensating for GDP-related fluctuations in emissions.  We 
have provided a theoretical analysis of emissions trading with endogenous intensity 
targets under output-linked and other uncertainties in emissions, applied it in a new 
multi-country empirical model of a post-Kyoto, cooperative climate treaty, and 
discussed the findings in a policy context.   
We have shown how, under which conditions, and by how much intensity targets 
could improve both participating countries' welfare and the environmental stringency of 
a global climate treaty, compared to a reference scenario using absolute targets.  
Standard intensity targets, which are indexed one-to-one to GDP, can reduce overall 
cost uncertainty and lead to better outcomes than absolute targets, but they can 
systematically over- or undercompensate for GDP-related fluctuations. In four out of 
our 18 regions, an absolute target would be preferable to one-to-one indexation. 
Optimal intensity targets, where the degree of indexation is tailored to the extent of each 
country's GDP-emissions linkage and the stringency of its target commitment, always 
perform better than absolute targets. We have derived a simple rule for optimal target 
indexation.  
In our model calibration of a 2020 climate treaty that covers all countries and the 
majority of greenhouse gases, standard and optimal intensity targets for all countries 
would result in a 10% and 17% increase in global abatement respectively, compared to 
absolute targets. Welfare improvements are larger still, and even if target levels were 
fixed and risk aversion played no role, optimal target indexation could increase dollar-
valued gains from a climate treaty by around 20%. The extent of the potential 
improvements depends on how uncertain future GDP is; how strong future links 
between fluctuations in emissions and in GDP are; how risk-averse decisionmakers are 
in negotiating a treaty; and whether uncertainties are framed only in terms of the treaty, 
or in terms of economies as a whole.  
Optimal degrees of indexation would differ strongly between countries, with ‘super-
indexation’ for many rich countries. For example, we find that Japan’s and Europe’s 
emissions targets would optimally rise or fall by about 1.3% and 1.2% respectively, if 
their GDPs turn out 1% higher or lower than expected. For developing countries by 
contrast, optimal indexation would typically be only partial. Tailoring target indexation 
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would offer great advantages over a one-size-fits-all approach, but would require 
detailed country-level analysis and may be difficult to negotiate. Whether or not a 
continuum of target indexation – rather than just the two-way choice between absolute 
and standard intensity targets – is appealing and practical to treaty negotiators remains 
to be seen.  
The degree of GDP-emissions linkage, its variation between countries, and 
consequently the importance of differentiated indexation also depends on which 
emissions sources are covered by the treaty. In further work, we plan to investigate 
optimal intensity targets for emissions from fossil fuel combustion only, which will 
necessitate more detailed empirical work on the linkage between fluctuations in GDP 
and energy sector emissions. Other future research may include applying the MAGES-
GHG model to non-cooperative (free riding) behaviour, and assessing the effect of 
flexible target design on free-riding incentives; and modeling other flexible target 
options, such as non-binding targets or a price cap in the permit market. 
Our overall policy conclusion is that intensity targets may offer a better chance of 
success for a future international greenhouse treaty than Kyoto-style absolute targets, 
but that they are certainly no magic wand. Flexible targets could help make target 
commitments more acceptable to developing countries, make it politically more 
acceptable for the United States to re-enter the process, and even help achieve more 
stringent climate commitments across the board. These advantages have to be weighed 
against increased complexity and the risk that intensity targets might be used as a means 
of window-dressing, making climate commitments look more stringent that they really 
are. Finally, while more flexible mechanism design can be useful, it will not resolve the 
deadlock in global climate negotiations: ultimately, economic restructuring to achieve 
deep cuts in global greenhouse emissions will be costly, and rich countries will have to 
pay if it is to happen.  
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Appendix: Calibration of the MAGES-GHG model  
Notes on calibration  
The following is in addition to description of the calibration in Section 4. The full 
set of parameters used in MAGES-GHG for a global climate treaty to take effect in the 
year 2020 is given in Table A1. 
Emissions, GDP and population 
Data for the base year 2000 are from the World Resource Institute's CAIT database 
(WRI 2003), which provides a compilation of data from a range of sources.  In 
calibrating BAU emissions Ebi we include carbon dioxide (CO2) from the energy sector 
(mainly combustion), CO2 from land-use change (mainly deforestation in tropical 
countries), and emissions of methane and nitrous oxide from a range of sources. 
Projected growth rates for BAU CO2 emissions at 2020 from the energy sector are taken 
from projections by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA 2004) and 
International Energy Agency (IEA 2004).  For non-energy GHG emissions, we 
extrapolate growth rates from 1990–2000, and for land-use change assume that annual 
emissions remain constant. 
For GDP, we use purchasing power parity (PPP-) adjusted GDP in the year 2000 as 
the basis for projections, and projections from EIA and IEA.  Population growth is 
extrapolated. 
Marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves 
Abatement potentials Mi are calibrated for energy-derived CO2 on the basis of 
structural characteristics of each country.  The relationship between abatement potential, 
emissions intensity of electricity production, and the overall emissions intensity of the 
economy, is estimated using abatement cost estimates from computable general 
equilibrium models (Ellerman and Decaux 1998, Polidano et al. 2000).  This yields a 
consistent set of abatement potentials for our calibration, which is more regionally 
disaggregated than published MAC estimates.  For non-CO2 emissions we derive 
relative abatement parameters from data cited by den Elzen and Lucas (2004); for land-
use change, we assume that relative abatement potential is broadly in line with that for 
non-CO2 emissions.  
Uncertainties and the GDP-emissions link 
The calibration of uncertainty parameters σ and the degree of GDP-emissions 
linkage αi is described in Section 4, and is based on empirical findings summarised in 
36 
Section 2.  Sufficient data is available to differentiate emissions uncertainties between 
Northern and Southern countries, while we use only one common parameter for MAC 
uncertainty. Uncertainty about emissions in the non-linked sector (σρi) differs between 
countries as they depend on the share of methane, nitrous oxide and CO2 from land-use 
change in each country. A separate paper on the empirical work is in preparation and 
can be requested from the authors. 
Valuation of emissions reductions 
Parameters for valuation of, or benefit from, global abatement are not observable, 
so we infer them on the basis of structural indicators. 
As discussed in Section 3, a political plausible calibration is achieved by setting 
each country’s relative per-capita valuation Vi/Li on the basis of per capita income Yi/Li 
as a proxy for ability to pay, and cumulative emissions of energy CO2 from 1970 to 
2000 per capita, as a proxy for historical responsibility for future climate change, with 
ability to pay weighted twice as heavily.  Total valuation V was chosen scaling so that 
our reference scenario exactly halves future growth in global emissions. Conveniently, 
our valuation shares for North and South fall halfway in-between the corresponding 
ratios of climate change damages in two well-known estimates (Fankhauser 1995 and 
Tol 2002, compiled in Finus et al. forthcoming), though there are large differences for 
individual countries.  
We did not opt to use damage estimates as a proxy for each country's valuation of 
global abatement for three reasons: (a) damage estimates at the national level are highly 
speculative; (b) small differences in social discount rates translate to large differences in 
valuation because of the long time frames involved; and (c) high expected long-term 
damages from climate change in poorer countries do not necessarily translate to a 
correspondingly high willingness to pay for emission reductions now, as poor countries 
have more pressing immediate concerns such as health and education (Schelling 1997). 
The slope parameter Wi of the GHG marginal benefit curve is chosen to be a small 
and constant share of Vi (Wi = Vi * 0.01). This results in a slight upward slope of the 
marginal benefit curve, in line with the well-recognised notion that due to the nature of 
greenhouse gases as a long-lived stock pollutant, the marginal damage curve is almost 
flat (Pizer 2002).   
Risk aversion 
See text in Section 4. 
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Table A1: Parameter values in the MAGES-GHG model  
Country 
(N) = ‘North’; the 
rest are ‘South’ 
Population 
(projected at 
2020) 
GDP (PPP 
adj., projected 
at 2020) 
Emissions 
(BAU)
Share of 
emissions linked 
with GDP (= 
energy sector 
share)
Absolute 
abatement 
potential
GDP 
uncertainty 
(standard 
deviation)
Emissions 
intensity 
uncertainty 
(standard 
deviation) 
Emissions 
uncertainty 
outside energy 
sector (st.dev.)
a
MAC 
uncertainty 
(standard 
deviation, for 
p = 15.33)
Valuation 
(benefit) 
function: 
constant
Valuation 
(benefit) 
function: 
slope
Risk 
aversion: 
concavity 
of payoff 
function
Risk aversion: 
weight on risk 
averse part of 
payoff 
function 
 billion 
trillion 
US$2000/yr 
Gt/yr (in 
CO2 
equivalent) .. G t2/yr.$ .. .. .. .. $/t yr/$ yr/$ $/yr 
 Li Yi Ebi αi Mi σYi σηi σρi σCi Vi Wi r zi=1/(Yi/Li) 
United States (N) 0.366 16.98 8.80      0.83 0.051 0.28 5.33 0.053 0.022 
Europe (N) 0.623 17.12 5.91      0.86 0.025 0.27 5.20 0.052 0.036 
Japan (N) 0.134 4.74 1.55      0.97 0.003 0.30 1.36 0.014 0.028 
Australia (N) 0.024 0.83 0.66      0.66 0.006 0.27 0.26 0.003 0.029 
Canada / NZ (N) 0.042 1.52 1.17      0.61 0.007 
0.20 0.22 
0.25 0.48 0.005 0.028 
Russia  0.195 2.77 2.85      0.91 0.031 0.25 1.49 0.015 0.070 
China  1.561 14.80 8.81      0.76 0.100 0.27 3.85 0.038 0.106 
India  1.453 7.64 3.04      0.58 0.030 0.28 1.78 0.018 0.190 
Brazil  0.225 2.40 2.57      0.23 0.021 0.30 0.57 0.006 0.094 
Argentina  0.048 0.91 0.45      0.48 0.003 0.28 0.23 0.002 0.053 
Mexico  0.136 1.77 0.84      0.74 0.006 0.27 0.46 0.005 0.077 
Korea (S.) 0.057 1.58 0.79      0.92 0.004 0.29 0.41 0.004 0.036 
Indonesia  0.276 1.42 3.45      0.18 0.033 0.30 0.34 0.003 0.194 
South-East Asia  0.264 2.31 2.21      0.43 0.018 0.29 0.56 0.006 0.114 
South Africa  0.063 1.03 0.66      0.89 0.006 0.26 0.31 0.003 0.062 
Northern Africa  0.202 1.33 0.74      0.69 0.006 0.26 0.34 0.003 0.152 
Middle East  0.322 2.12 2.41      0.66 0.021 0.24 0.63 0.006 0.152 
Rest of the World 2.160 6.74 7.12      0.32 0.057 
0.27 0.37 
0.28 
6.34 
1.89 0.019 
0.8617 
0.320 
Aggregates: 
North 1.2 41.2 18.0 0.83 0.091 0.20 0.22 .. 12.6 0.126 0.029 
South 7.0 46.8 35.9 0.55 0.335 0.27 0.37 .. 12.9 0.129 0.149 
Global 8.2 88.0 54.0 0.64 0.426 .. .. .. 
6.34 
25.5 0.255 
0.8617 
0.093 
Europe includes Western and Eastern Europe (EU-28 countries plus Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Balcan states; RUS: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus; South-East Asia includes 
Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand (not Indonesia); Northern Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia; Middle East includes 
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates, Yemen; Rest of the World includes all other countries 
(including much of Africa, South America and South Asia). 
a: Standard deviations for emissions outside the energy sector: Methane 0.22; nitrous oxide 0.33; CO2 from land-use change 0.31. σρi depends on shares of these gases in each country. 
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